9-18-2012 - Motion - Strike CV - DC0902215 - 10480787 - MOTION - STRIKE September 18, 2012 (2024)

9-18-2012 - Motion - Strike CV - DC0902215 - 10480787 - MOTION - STRIKE September 18, 2012 (1)

9-18-2012 - Motion - Strike CV - DC0902215 - 10480787 - MOTION - STRIKE September 18, 2012 (2)

  • 9-18-2012 - Motion - Strike CV - DC0902215 - 10480787 - MOTION - STRIKE September 18, 2012 (3)
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  • 9-18-2012 - Motion - Strike CV - DC0902215 - 10480787 - MOTION - STRIKE September 18, 2012 (9)
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Filed 12 September 18 P5:04 Gary Fitzsimmons District Clerk Dallas District CAUSE NO. 09-02215 GABRIELA SAENZ ROBINSON, as next § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Friend of RUBEN PINALES, § Plaintiff, § vs. § OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS § JORGE FABIO LLAMAS-SOFORO, M.D.; § JORGE FABIO LLAMAS-SOFORO, M.D., P.A., § D/B/A EL PASO EYE CARE CENTER; § LUIS ALBERTO AYO, M.D.; PEDIATRIX § MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A.; § PEDIATRI MEDICAL GROUP, INC.; ROY § JOHN CAVIGLIA, M.D.; FORTUNATO § PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D.; JOSE § BERNARDO ARLLANO, M.D.; AND § VIBHA HONKAN, M.D., § Defendants. § 160th JUDICIAL DISTRICT DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO AYO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COME NOW, Defendants Luis Alberto Ayo, M.D., Roy John Caviglia, M.D., Fortato Perez-Benavides, M.D., Jose Bernardo Arellano, M.D., Pediatrix Medical Group of Texas, P.A. and Pediatrix Medical Group, Inc. ("Neonatology Defendants") and fie their Objections to and Motion to Strike Causation Opinions as Unreliable, and would respectfully show the Cour as follows: I. BACKGROUND Because Plaintiff s causation theories are not scientifically reliable under the standards DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AN PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC's OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNELIABLE - Page 1 918.0140/479963.1 required by Tex. R. Evid. 702, the Neonatology Defendants now move to strike Plaintiffs causation testimony by their experts. Plaintiff s pediatric ophthalmology expert Wiliam Good, M.D. provides some opinions on causation along with, to a lesser extent, her neonatology expert Marcus Hermansen, M.D. The Neonatology Defendants contend Dr. Hermansen is not qualified to provide causation opinions, and Plaintiff should not be allowed to improperly refer to his opinions, be it directly or indirectly. i Dr. Good's causation opinions establish, at best, a loss of chance for Ruben Isaia Pinales. Such claims are not recognized in Texas; therefore, these opinions are based on an improper legal standard and are likewise unreliable. Moreover, Dr. Good does not exclude other plausible causes of Ruben Isaia's vision problems, and the failure to do so renders Dr. Good's testimony inadmissible under the standards set out in Havner. Plaintiff canot segregate her damages (as is their burden under Texas law). The Neonatology Defendants respectfully request that the Cour, in its fuction as gatekeeper, exclude such opinions from evidence before the trier of fact. II. ARGUMENTS & AUTHORITIES A. Expert Testimony Must Be Reliable. Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides that "if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skil, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." TEx. R. EVID. 702. The standard for determining IDr. Hermansen's few statements on causation are the same as Dr. Good, so references to Dr. Good's opinions are also a direct challenge to Dr. Hermansen's opinion should the Cour rule he is qualified to testify in this regard. DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 2 918.0140/479963.1 what wil assist the trier offact has become more stringent as scientific evidence conflcts and expert witnesses disagree. In order to avoid having cases decided on testimony which is nothing more than conjecture or speculation, the Texas Supreme Cour and Texas Legislature have promulgated a set of standards that establish what constitutes legally sufficient evidence and appropriate expert testimony. See, e.g., TEx. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE AN. §§ 74.401, 74.403; E.l Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997). Expert witness testimony is "uneliable if it is not grounded in methods and procedures of science and is no more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Couch v. Simmons, 108 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. App.-Amarilo 2003, no pet.). The Texas Supreme Cour in Robinson ariculated six non-exclusive factors that the trial cour may consider in determining the reliabilty of expert opinions: (1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; (2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; (3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; (4) the technique's potential rate of error; (5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and (6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557. In cases where not all of the Robinson factors are applicable, it is proper for the trial cour to consider whether there is too great of an "analytical gap" between the DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'s OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 3 918.0140/479963.1 data and the expert's testimony. See id. at 726; see also Havner, 953 S. W.2d at 727; Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623,629 (Tex. 2002). Even in cases in which the cour does not utilize these six factors to assess expert reliability, the expert must stil explain the bases for opinions and how those observations support the ultimate conclusion. Gammil, 972 S.W.2d at 727-28. In Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997), the Supreme Cour added a "foundation test" to the reliability and relevancy analysis spelled out in Robinson. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714. That is, an expert's opinion must be based on sufficient "underlying facts or data" and wil be inadmissible if the opinion is based on unreliable foundation evidence. Id Moreover, the Havner Cour cited Robinson and explained that, to surive a legal suffciency review, the plaintiff must offer evidence that excludes other "plausible" causation scenarios, to a reasonable degree of certinty. Id at 720. Finally, in Gammil, the Supreme Cour held that the rules governing admissibilty of expert testimony should not differ due to the fact that the evidence is considered novel or unconventionaL. Gammil, 972 S.W.2d at 721. In this regard, when considering "non- scientific" experts who base their opinions on observation and experience, such opinions that fail the "analytical gap" test should be stricken. Id at 727-728. That is, an expert's testimony is inadmissible if the expert fails to show how his observations support his conclusions. Id at 726. For instance, if the expert brings only his credentials and subjective opinion, his testimony is unsupported and therefore of no assistance to the jur. Id Cours are also willng to strike experts due to uneliability where an expert's opinion is based on assumed facts that var materially from the actual, undisputed facts. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497,500 (Tex. 1995). DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNLIABLE - Page 4 918.0140/479963.1 Before Plaintiff may present Dr. Good or Dr. Hermansen's testimony, the Cour must exercise its duty as a gatekeeper and determine whether the testimony is reliable. See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556; see also TEx. R. EVID. 703. Plaintiffs causation theories do not pass muster. B. Dr. Hermansen is Not Qualifed to Discuss Causation. Although Dr. Hermansen at times mentions causation and Plaintiff may try to elicit same, he is not qualified to opine as to whether Isaia's injuries were a proximate result ofthe Neonatology Defendants' alleged negligence. See Dr. Hermansen's deposition, page 55, line 19 - page 56, line 13. Dr. Hermansen did not produce any literature, studies, or reliable bases for his opinion, nor could he provide any in his deposition. C. Dr. Good's Opinion Regarding Plus Disease Is Without Foundation. Dr. Good offers the opinion that Isaia must have reached threshold during the time Dr. Llamas was out of town. This means that Isaia had to develop plus disease in at least 5 contiguous clock hours of Stage 3 disease. Dr. Good bases his opinion on his belief that Dr. Hernandez described bilateral retinal detachments, meaning Isaia had a poor structural outcome. This opinion is without scientific basis. First, for a child to need treatment in 2000, he had to have plus disease - dilation and tortosity of the areries and veins of the retina. It is undisputed that according to the medical records, Isaia never had plus disease. Dr. Good then hypothesizes that Isaia developed plus disease in the 25 day period from 8/31 to 9/25 and that the plus disease disappeared in that period of time. He bases this on data from CRYO-ROP and ETROP showing the median time for plus disease. 100 DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AN MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNELIABLE - Page 5 918.0140/479963.1 10 Q. Tell me every basis for your opinion that he 11 developed at least five clock hours of Stage II 12 disease and plus disease in the time period between 13 August 31 st and September 25th. 14 A. I base it on what we know about the timing of 15 the development of ROP, and that's in one of those 16 aricles I produced. I believe that on the basis of 17 the finding of cicatricial changes, that characteristic 18 time as ROP is progressing, serious ROP is progressing, 19 documented by Dr. Llamas. And that was in October. 20 And my opinion is also based -- this is where 21 I think he had retinal detachments. It's also based on 22 the fact that on many occasions, he was documented as 23 having very, very low vision. And that's consistent 24 with retinal detachments and, to a probability, having 25 gone through threshold disease. Second, for a child to need treatment, he needed at least 5 consecutive hours of Stage 3 disease. Dr. Good again relies on the CRYO-ROP and ETROP median data to support his opinion. Dr. Good has never seen a child develop plus disease and 5 consecutive hours of Stage 3 disease and have it disappear completely during this age range, either in his private practice or in any clinical trial or aricle. Isaia would literally be the first such child ever to have disease behave this way. 101 6 Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned that one of the 7 aricles talked about the timing of development in ROP. 8 Which aricle were you talking about? 9 A. It's the incidence paper. It's right on top. 10 Q. That's Exhibit 21? 11 A. 21. Uh-huh. 12 Q. All right. And what portion of that aricle 13 are you relying on for that purose? 14 A. So there's a Table 5. And Table 5 compares 15 the CRYO-ROP study with the ETROP study and describes 16 the average age at which infants developed Stage I, 17 Stage II, Stage II, and plus disease. And it was 18 quite similar comparing both studies. DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARLLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'s OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNLIABLE - Page 6 918.0140/479963.1 The median data on which Dr. Good relies deals with onset of plus disease and Stage 3 disease. The Table 5 shows that plus disease had its median onset at 36.3 weeks post conceptual age (PCA) and that Stage 3 disease had its median onset at 36.6 weeks PCA. Isaia was 37.5 weeks PCA on 9/25. Dr. Good literally has no evidence that Isaia could have developed plus disease and Stage 3 disease in that time frame and had plus disease completely disappear while the stage 3 disease worsened. He has no evidence that his theory is scientifically reliable. D. Dr. Good Cannot Establish an Absolute Benefit from Treatment that is Greater than 50%; as such, Plaintiffs' Proximate Cause Argument is Based on Loss of Chance. In order to establish the element of proximate cause, Plaintiff must demonstrate that more likely than not, the proposed treatment (including timing, natue of treatment, etc.) would have avoided the damage claimed. The Texas Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected the "loss of chance" argument - that a patient who had a chance of a better outcome should be allowed to recover. Unless the patient had a greater than 50% chance of avoiding the claimed damage, that patient may not recover damages in Texas. The best that can be said about Dr. Good's opinions is that they amount to a "loss of chance claim." Such claims are not recognized in Texas; therefore, the opinions are based on an improper legal standard and are likewise uneliable. According to the published literatue, 45% of babies with ROP who are treated timely go on to have visual acuity less that 20/200 (legally blind). Dr. Good canot establish, based on personal experience, scientific literature or any other reliable basis that Ruben Isaia had a greater than 50% chance of good visual acuity based on anything Dr. Llamas did DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'s OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNELIABLE - Page 7 918.0140/479963.1 or failed to do. He merely opines that there would have been a difference in outcome with timely treatment; no one can show what the difference in outcome is when the damage is already (to use Plaintiffs word) irreversible. Dr. Good's testimony is solely based on loss of chance, not on science or expenence. To prevail on a medical negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must prove four elements. Plaintiff must prove that the treating physician has a duty to act according to an applicable standard of care, a breach of that standard of care, injur resulting from that breach, and a causal connection between the breach and the injur. Schorlemer v. Reyes, 974 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). The Supreme Cour addressed claims of lost chance of recovery in Kramer v. Lewisvile, in which it determined that the ultimate standard of proof on causation is whether the negligent act or omission is a substantial factor in bringing about the har and without which the har would not have occured. Kramer, 858 S.W.2d at 400. This standard must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The effect of this standard of proof is "to bar recovery where the defendant's negligence deprived the tort victim of only a 50% or less chance of avoiding the ultimate har." !d. In Kramer, the Cour determined that there is no liabilty in Texas for negligent medical treatment that decreases a patient's chance of avoiding har when the har most probably would have occured regardless of the negligence. Park Place Hasp. v. Estate of Milo, 909 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. 1995). The Cour also rejected all versions of and variations on the loss of chance doctrine, including "the increased risk of har theory." Marvell v. Alston, 100 S.W.3d 460, 481 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003). The Fort Worth Cour of Appeals in Marvell went on to clarify: DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'s OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 8 918.0140/479963.1 "Evidence of an increased risk of har, as one version of the loss of chance theory, is not legally suffcient evidence if the risk would not be increased to a probability of greater than fift percent." Id. Thus, Plaintiffs claims are bared unless Dr. Llamas' actions caused Plaintiff to have less than 50% chance of recovery. In Kramer, the Supreme Court determined that, in a medical malpractice claim, there is no liabilty for "negligent treatment that decreases a patient's chance of avoiding death or other medical conditions in cases where the adverse result probably would have occured anyway." Id. The Cour goes on to state: Unless cours are going to compensate patients who 'beat the odds' and make full recovery, the lost chance canot be proven unless and until the ultimate har occurs. Hence, legal responsibility under the loss of chance doctrine is in reality assigned based on the mere possibilty that a tortfeasor's negligence was a cause of the ultimate har. Id. at 404 (emphasis in original). Under Texas law a plaintiff must establish a probability of more than 50% that a defendant's negligence in a medical malpractice case caused the loss or har that Plaintiff alleges. Here, Plaintiff has no plausible causation theory against the Neonatology Defendants. Moreover, even assuming somehow the Neonatology Defendants should and could have altered Dr. Llamas' decision makng in this case, Plaintiff canot establish, as a matter of law, that Dr. Llamas actions or inactions caused Isaia's risk of a poor visual outcome by more than 50%. Some basic and undisputed science is helpful to the analysis. Of all prematue babies who develop ROP, 94% never need treatment for their disease. DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIA TRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AN PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNELIABLE - Page 9 918.0140/479963.1 42 3 Q. And so put another way, 94 percent of the 4 babies who actually had ROP never needed treatment, 5 right? 6 A. I think that's correct. See Exhibit "B," Deposition of Dr. Good, page 42, lines 3-6. The treatment for ROP, which consists of destruction of the avascular retina with either laser or cryotherapy, caries significant risk to the child. As such, the child must have a certain severity of disease (called "threshold" disease) before the benefit of treatment outweighs the risk: 37 19 Q. Back in 2000, when Isaia Pinales was being 20 treated for his premature birth, there was a term 21 called "threshold for treatment of ROP," correct? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. And there were certin criteria which we'll 24 get into later, but the threshold was a certain degree 25 of severity ofROP at which point it was deemed 38 1 appropriate to provide ablative treatment, correct? 2 A. Correct. Id at page 37, Line 19 - Page 38, Line 2. Moreover, since such a large percentage of children who have ROP never need treatment, unecessar surgery should be avoided unless the strict criteria for treatment are met, and the child has threshold disease. 42 7 Q. And certainly, you do not ever want to 8 endanger a child by performing unnecessar surgical 9 treatment, true? 10 MR. RAEY: Objection. Form. 11 THE WITNESS: Well, as stated by you, yeah, 12 that's true. DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIES, M.D., JOSE BERNARO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'s OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNELIABLE - Page 10 918.0140/479963.1 Id at page 42, Lines 7-12. The goal oftreatment was to avoid, if possible, retinal detachment at the back, or posterior, portion of the retina. 49 2 Q. The unavorable outcome definition that we 3 just used of posterior retinal detachment, retinal fold 4 involving the macula, or retrolental tissue obscuring 5 the posterior pull. 6 A. I don't know if that's true, because I haven't 7 looked at those papers. 8 Q. All right. If that is, indeed, the result of 9 those papers, you don't disagree with their findings, I 10 take it? 11 MR. RAMEY: Objection. Form. 12 THE WITNESS: Well, no, I don't. If that, 13 indeed, is applicable papers. Id. at page 49, Lines 2-13. At the time ofIsaia's treatment, a large randomized clinical trial (known as CR YO- ROP) set out the benchmark by which ophthalmologists determined when a child had a favorable outcome from their ROP or when they had an unavorable outcome. These benchmarks applied whether the child had treatment or did not. The study demonstrated that while there was a benefit to treatment in children whose disease was at threshold, that benefit was not more than 50%. In fact, there was only a 21.9% improvement in structual outcomes with treatment as opposed to those eyes which did not receive treatment. 173 13 Q. All right. Well, the treated eyes, even with 14 treatment by the best docs at the best institutions, 15 had an unfavorable structual outcome 30 percent of the 16 time 15 years later, didn't they? DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AN PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'s OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 11 918.0140/479963.1 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. The control or untreated eyes had an 19 unfavorable structual outcome 51.9 percent of the 20 time? 21 A. Point to me where you're looking. 22 Q. (Indicating.) 23 A. That's correct. 24 Q. And if we do the subtraction, the difference 25 between the eyes that were treated and the eyes that 174 1 received no treatment at all is 21.9 percent with 2 respect to structual outcome, isn't it? 3 A. Yes. See Exhibit "B" at page 173, line 13 -- page 174, line 3. Even in looking at visual acuity, eyes which received treatment only had a favorable visual outcome 19.6% more of the time than did the eyes which received not treatment. 174 4 Q. Okay. And if we go to the right and look at 5 the colums under "Unfavorable Visual Acuity Outcomes," 6 we note that the treated eyes at 15 years had an 7 unfavorable visual acuity of 44.7 percent? 8 A. Correct. 9 Q. And the control or untreated eyes had an 10 unfavorable visual acuity outcome of 64.3 percent? 11 A. Correct. 12 Q. A real difference of 19.6 percent, correct? 13 A. Correct. DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO AYO, M.D., ROY JOHN CAVIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRI MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 12 918.0140/479963.1 Id at page 174, lines 4-13. Even had Isaia undergone treatment as alleged by the Plaintiff, his ability to improve either structural outcome or his visual outcome was only about 20% (a range of 19.6-21.9%). More likely than not, then, based on the evidence, Isaia's outcome could not have been improved to a reasonable degree of medical probabilty. As such, Plaintiff canot prove an essential element of their claim-that the Defendants proximately caused injur to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Plaintiffs only expert concedes that the only available evidence at the time shows that even with timely and appropriate treatment, the outcomes were not improved more than 50% of the time. The Fort Worth Cour of Appeals expressly relied on the data in the CRYO-ROP study in holding that an expert's testimony on causation in an ROP case, which testimony was inconsistent with the results of the CRYO-ROP study, lacked scientific foundation and should not have been admitted by the trial court. See Gross v. Burt, 149 S.W.3d 213, 230-241 (Tex.App. - Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). The same is true here: Dr. Good's opinions on causation lack any scientific basis and are inconsistent with the admitted findings of the CRYO-ROP study. Therefore, they provide no evidence of proximate cause because they completely lack factual foundation. With respect to ROP, the only large prospective randomized trial evaluating treatment versus nontreatment of ROP was the "Multicenter Trial of Cryotherapy for Retinopathy of Prematuity" ("CRYO-ROP"). The CRYO-ROP Trial is the best available data on the benefit ofROP treatment, according to Plaintiffs own ophthalmology expert, Dr. Good. 46 9 Q. The CRYO-ROP study was the only large DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRI MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 13 918.0140/479963.1 10 perspective randomized clinical trial evaluating 11 treatment versus nontreatment of ROP that was available 12 at the time ofIsaia's care in 2000, right? 13 A. I believe that's correct, yes. 177 7 Q. Have any similar epidemiologic studies to 8 CRYO-ROP been performed to study the benefit of 9 treatment versus no treatment? 10 A. No. 11 Q. And is it your belief and opinion that no such 12 study wil ever be done because it would likely be 13 unethical and not pass the requisite ethics panels to 14 implement such a study? 15 A. Yes, it would be unethicaL. 16 Q. SO this date is the best we've got on the 17 benefit of treatment? 18 A. Yes. See Exhibit "B" at page 46, lines 9-13 and page 177, lines 7-18. CRYO-ROP studied the efficacy of cryotherapy. 165 23 Q. Okay. CRYO-ROP was an attempt to determine 24 whether or not treatment for threshold retinopathy of 25 prematurity was effcacious? 166 1 A. Correct. Id at page 165, line 23 - page 166, line 1. The subjects of the Multicenter Trial were followed and re-evaluated at three-and-a-halfyears, five-and-a-halfyears, ten years, and fifteen years. 172 5 Q. And you note that at 3 and a half, 5 and a 6 half, 10 years, and 15 years these babies were 7 restudied to see how much better the treated eye was DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIA TRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'s OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 14 918.0140/479963.1 8 fuctioning versus the untreated eye? 9 A. Yes. Id at page 172, lines 5-9. The most recent follow-up of CRYO-ROP discusses and identifies the outcomes of eyes that received treatment, as well as eyes that did not receive treatment. 171 24 Q. Doctor, Exhibit 31 is, I wil represent to 25 you, a Table 3 from the Archives of Ophthalmology, 172 1 March of2005, which is a sumar of the structual and 2 visual acuity outcomes for the CRYO-ROP babies. 3 Does this look familiar to you? 4 A. It does. 5 Q. And you note that at 3 and a half, 5 and a 6 half, 10 years, and 15 years these babies were 7 restudied to see how much better the treated eye was 8 fuctioning versus the untreated eye? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. And to the best of your recollection of the 11 medical statistics and data, does Table 3 accurately 12 state the difference in structural and visual acuity 13 outcome for the treated versus control eye for the 14 cohort? 15 MR. RAMEY: Objection. Form. 16 THE WITNESS: It does. It does. Id at page 171, line 24 - page 172, line 16. The results of this study are ilustrated in "Table 3" of attched Exhibit "C" and reproduced below: DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VIGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRI MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNELIABLE - Page 15 918.0140/479963.1 Abr8: CAYOOP, liuI Trl ci Cl)er 10 ReUnohy of Pr. "Vues II øll as perc_ft. fRonvlal~no mein 111 Yl. $l HO Raii Vl8U Ac1i11y Te used. §A,u for dJsitna fòp mes (see ""p!lll~an "Vsu Acult subse 01 "R8S Slcton). As can be seen from the results in Table 3, treatment provides at most a 21.9% increase in avoiding an unfavorable structural outcome and a 19.6% increase in avoiding an unfavorable visual acuity outcome. These results, at their highest, are a far cry from the minimum "greater than 50%" standard that Texas law requires. In other words, for Plaintiff to prove causation in her case, she is required to show that treatment would have provided more than a 50% improvement in likelihood that Isaia would have avoided his outcome, compared to no treatment at all. As can clearly be seen, treatment only provides approximately a 20% improvement in likelihood that Isaia would have avoided his outcome. Plaintiff s own expert conceded that the benefit of treatment only provides approximately 20% benefit. DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARDO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRI MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AN MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 16 918.0140/479963.1 172 10 Q. And to the best of your recollection of the 11 medical statistics and data, does Table 3 accurately 12 state the difference in structual and visual acuity 13 outcome for the treated versus control eye for the 14 cohort? 15 MR. RAMEY: Objection. Form. 16 THE WITNESS: It does. It does. 17 BY MR. SCHELL: 18 Q. You know, it occurs to me that there is a 19 remarkable consistency in the difference between the 20 favorable and unfavorable structural outcomes of the 21 treated and control eyes over this 15-year period. 22 Did you note that? 23 A. There is a consistency, yes. 24 Q. I mean, it's within, what, about two 25 percentage points? 173 1 A. Or so, uh-huh. 2 Q. Okay. And what this means, if we go to the 3 15-year last time the cohort was studied, is that there 4 is a 21.9 percent relative benefit of treatment from a 5 structual outcome standpoint. 6 A. I'm not sure I agree entirely with how you've 7 expressed that, but there is a difference of 8 29.1 percent. 9 Q. How would you express it? 10 A. There is a difference of21.9 percent between 11 those eyes that were maintained as controls and those 12 that were treated. 13 Q. All right. Well, the treated eyes, even with 14 treatment by the best docs at the best institutions, 15 had an unfavorable structual outcome 30 percent of the 16 time 15 years later, didn't they? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. The control or untreated eyes had an 19 unavorable structual outcome 51.9 percent of the 20 time? 21 A. Point to me where you're looking. 22 Q. (Indicating.) DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIDES, M.D., JOSE BERNARO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABLE - Page 17 918.0140/479963.1 23 A. That's correct. 24 Q. And if we do the subtraction, the difference 25 between the eyes that were treated and the eyes that 174 1 received no treatment at all is 21.9 percent with 2 respect to structural outcome, isn't it? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. Okay. And if we go to the right and look at 5 the colums under "Unfavorable Visual Acuity Outcomes," 6 we note that the treated eyes at 15 years had an 7 unavorable visual acuity of 44.7 percent? 8 A. Correct. 9 Q. And the control or untreated eyes had an 10 unfavorable visual acuity outcome of 64.3 percent? 11 A. Correct. See Exhibit "B", page 172, line 1 0 to page 174, line 11. It is incumbent on Plaintiff to establish that the extent epidemiologic data addressing the efficacy ofROP therapy supports a greater than 50% probabilty of an improved visual outcome with treatment. It is undisputed that had Isaia been treated, he would have only had a 20% chance of avoiding his injuries, according to the only data available on this matter. i Plaintiff fails to provide suffcient evidence of causation as a matter of law. Plaintiff s claims amount to nothing more than "loss of chance" claims, and such claims are impermissible under Texas law. Were Plaintiff to dispute the outcome data from CRYO-ROP, Plaintiff would need an expert to have offered a timely opinion on what the difference in outcome would have been, to a reasonable degree of medical probabilty, and then provide the scientific basis for that opinion. Plaintiff s only expert on outcomes, Dr. Good, failed and declined to offer any such opinion in either his report or i This is assuming Isaia's eyes ever reached a treatable state, which all defendants contend never occured. DEFENDANTS LUIS ALBERTO A YO, M.D., ROY JOHN CA VlGLIA, M.D., FORTUNATO PEREZ-BENAVIES, M.D., JOSE BERNARO ARELLANO, M.D., PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP OF TEXAS, P.A. AND PEDIATRIX MEDICAL GROUP, INC.'S OBJECTIONS TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE CAUSATION OPINIONS AS UNRELIABL

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Dempewolf vs. Correa

Jul 15, 2024 |22CV-0199626

DEMPEWOLF VS. CORREACase Number: 22CV-0199626This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacatedby the Court’s order dated May 31, 2024 Order. The Court designates this matter as exempt fromcase disposition time standards. Both Plaintiff and Defendant have posted jury fees. The partiesare ordered to appear to provide the Court with available trial dates.

Ruling

SASCHA LYNCH VS GERSON JACTON MORENO

Jul 18, 2024 |20STCV47990

Case Number: 20STCV47990 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 68 Dept. 68 Date: 7-18-24 Case 20STCV47990 Trial Date: N/A REOPEN DISCOVERY MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff, Sascha Lynch, pro per RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed/Defendant, Gerson Moreno RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to Reopen Discovery SUMMARY OF ACTION On January 2, 2019, plaintiff Sascha Lynch was involved in an automobile collision with defendant Gerson Jacton Moreno (Defendant) on the northbound 110 Freeway in Los Angeles. On December 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint against for motor vehicle negligence. On January 18, 2024, the court vacated the March 25, 2024, trial date. On February 21, 2024, the court dismissed the case at the request of Plaintiff Sascha Lynch without prejudice. The court also retained jurisdiction to make orders to enforce any and all terms of settlement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. RULING: Moot/Off-Calendar. Request for Judicial Notice: Denied. Plaintiff Sascha Lynch moves for the court to reopen discovery in order for Plaintiff to verify the accuracy of the responses to discovery from respondent, defendant Gerson Jacton Moreno aka Gerson Jacton Moreno Garcia. The entire action was dismissed on February 21, 2024. While the motion was filed after the dismissal, the court finds nothing in the motion supporting a basis for relief given the dismissal of the entire action, or even a threshold argument for an arguable enforcement of the settlement agreement. The court declines to address the extensive arguments in the motion, opposition, and reply given the lack of address of the dismissal itself under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 The motion is therefore moot and taken off-calendar. Plaintiff to provide notice.

Ruling

JESUS MANUEL GUERRA, AN INDIVIDUAL VS PALMETO VILLAS, INC., A COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |23AHCV01104

Case Number: 23AHCV01104 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT PABLO MARTINEZS DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT I. INTRODUCTION This negligence action arises from a slip and fall incident on property located at 21 Palmetto Drive in Alhambra, California. Plaintiff Jesus Manuel Guerra (Plaintiff) alleges that Defendant Pablo Martinez (Defendant) owned the property, Defendant Palmetto Villas, Inc. (Palmetto) managed the property and Defendant Complete Landscape & Gardening Services maintained the property. Plaintiff, a resident of 21 Palmetto Drive, Unit D, alleges that on May 20, 2021, he slipped and fell while walking on a pathway at the locations entrance. Plaintiff further alleges that a puddle of water and/or accumulated algae cause this accident. On May 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint alleging causes of action for (1) general negligence as to all three Defendants and (2) premises liability as to Defendants Palmetto Villas, Inc. and Pablo Martinez. On September 27, 2023, Defendant Martinez filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint because Plaintiff only alleged that Defendant owned unit D, not the site where the slip and fall occurred. On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer with leave to amend. (1/17/24 Minute Order) On February 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC). On March 4, 2024, Defendant Pablo Martinez (Defendant) filed the instant Demurrer to Plaintiffs FAC pursuant to CCP § 430.10, concurrently with notice and Declaration of John Fu, Esq., (Fu Decl.). On July 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants Demurrer with the Declaration of Thomas R. Burns, Esq., (Burns Decl.) and attached exhibits. Plaintiff has not filed a reply. A hearing is scheduled for July 18, 2024. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Demurrer Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(e) provides for a demurrer on the basis that a complaint fails to state a cause of action. A demurrer admits, provisionally for purposes of testing the pleading, all material facts properly pleaded. Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1247. A demurrer is treated as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967. The general rule on demurrer is that the pleadings are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.4th 593, 604. Questions of plaintiffs ability to prove unlikely allegations are of no concern. Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214. A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994. A plaintiffs allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of demurrer, no matter how improbable they are. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604 (Del E. Webb). Allegations need not be accepted as true if they are contradicted by judicially noticeable facts. Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474. Pleadings are to be broadly construed (Code Civ. Proc. §452) and demurrers are to be overruled where the facts are sufficient to state any cause of action. Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38. A demurrer challenges defects appearing on the face of the complaint or in judicially noticeable material but cannot be based on evidence. Speaking demurrers are not permitted. Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023), §7.8. Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(f) provides for a demurrer where a pleading is uncertain. Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are only sustained where a pleading is so incomprehensible a defendant cannot reasonably respond. A.J. Fistes v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695; Khoury v. Malys of California (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616. III. ANALYSIS A. Demurrer On September 27, 2023, Defendant filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint on the grounds that it was a sham pleading because the original complaint did not identify Defendant as the owner of the entire property. Plaintiffs original complaint states that Plaintiff is informed and believes & Defendant PABLO MARTINEZ was and is & the owner of Unit D located on the Premises. (Compl., ¶ 3, emphasis added.) On January 17, 2024, the Court sustained Defendants Demurrer to Plaintiffs complaint with leave to amend. (1/17/24 Minute Order) The operative FAC states that Plaintiff is informed and believes & Defendant PABLO MARTINEZ was and is & the owner of the Premises. (Compl., ¶ 3, emphasis added.) On February 27, 2024, Defendant and Plaintiffs counsel met and conferred on the issue of Defendants ownership interest of the premises and did not reach a resolution, necessitating the instant motion. (Fu Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A; Motion, p. 5.) Based upon this, the Court finds that the meet and confer requirement has been satisfied. On March 4, 2024, Defendant filed another Demurrer, moving the Court to sustain the demurrer based on the argument that Plaintiffs original and amended complaints contain inconsistent factual allegations. Defendants position is that the FAC attempts to plead around the defect and therefore amounts to a sham pleading. (Motion, p. 3.) Defendant argues that when a plaintiff attempts to circumvent factual problems by pleading new inconsistent facts in an amended complaint, the plaintiff must provide explain why such a drastic change has occurred. If Plaintiff is unable to do so, the new pleading will be treated as a sham and be disregarded. (Del E. Webh Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 593, 604; Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 379, 384; and Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 13, cited by 6 Cal. Prac. Guide, Civ. Proc. Bef-Trial, Sec. 7:48.) Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule the demurrer because the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable when the facts change due to information obtained in discovery. (Oppn., p. 2.) Plaintiff argues that the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable because Co-Defendant Palmetto provided new information during discovery to support Plaintiffs amended allegation that Defendant Martinez owns the entire property, including the incident location. (FAC, ¶¶ 18, 24.) Pursuant to the sham pleading doctrine, any inconsistencies with prior pleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations. (Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 343.) Courts will not close their eyes to situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts that are judicially noticed. (Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400.) Given the information obtained through discovery, the Court finds that Plaintiff has appropriately explained the change in the allegations of ownership from the original complaint to the FAC. On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff served Special Interrogatories, Set One, on Defendant Palmetto. On October 30, 2023, Palmetto timely responded to the Special Interrogatories as follows: Special Interrogatory No. 1: IDENTIFY the PERSON who owed the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 1: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 2: IDENTIFY the PERSON who leased the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 4: IDENTIFY the PERSON who controlled the PREMISES at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 4: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. Special Interrogatory No. 6: IDENTIFY the PERSON who owned the LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT at the time of the INCIDENT. Response to Special Interrogatory No. 2: Responding Party identifies Pablo Martinez (solo_raiders@hotmail.com) as the owner of the premises where Plaintiff was a tenant. Discovery and investigation is ongoing and continuing, and Responding Party reserves the right to amend this response up to and including the time of trial. (Oppn., Exh. B, pp. 2-3.) Plaintiff did not possess this information at the time he filed his original complaint. Plaintiff received this information on October 30, 2023. After the Court sustained Defendant Martinezs demurrer to the original complaint, Plaintiff relied on this information when filing the FAC. Therefore, the inconsistent facts between the initial complaint and the FAC are sufficiently explained to bypass an application of the sham pleading doctrine. Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Defendants demurrer to the FAC. IV. ORDER Defendant Martinezs Demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant to answer within 15 days. Counsel for Plaintiff to give notice of this order. Dated: July 18, 2024 JARED D. MOSESJUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

Ruling

ALFONSO MORA VS JED'S MARKET, INC., ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |23LBCV00172

Case Number: 23LBCV00172 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: S27 Defendants propounded RFAs, set one and FROGs, set two on Plaintiff on 4/04/24. Defendants propounded FROGs, set three, SROGs, set two, and RFAs, set three on Plaintiff on 4/10/24. On 5/15/24 and 5/16/24, Defendants filed motions to compel responses to the above interrogatories and to deem the above RFAs admitted, setting them for hearing on various dates. On 6/03/24, the Court rescheduled the hearing on all of the motions to 7/18/24. Defendants gave notice of the ruling the same day. To date, Plaintiff has not served responses to any of the propounded discovery. Defendants therefore seek an order compelling Plaintiff to respond, without objections, to the outstanding discovery, deeming the RFAs admitted, and requiring Plaintiff to pay sanctions. Defendants motions to compel are granted. Plaintiff is ordered to serve verified responses to the above-detailed interrogatories, without objections, within five days. The Court notes that time is of the essence, as the case is scheduled for trial on 8/06/24. CCP §§2030.290(a),(b). Defendants motions to deem RFAs, sets two and three, admitted are also granted. CCP §2033.280(a), (b). Sanctions are mandatory. §§2030.290(c), 2033.280(c). Defendants seek sanctions in the varying amounts in connection with each motion. Counsel bills at the rate of $210/hour. The Court awards one hour of time to prepare each of these form discovery motions. No opposition was filed and therefore no reply was necessary. The Court awards one hour to appear at the hearing on the motions, as the Court strongly encourages remote appearance. The Court therefore awards a total of six hours of attorney time at the requested rate $210/hour, or $1320 in attorneys fees. The Court also awards five filing fees of $60 each, or $300 in costs. Sanctions are sought against and imposed against Plaintiff, in pro per; he is ordered to pay sanctions to Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, in the amount of $1620, within twenty days. Defendants are ordered to give notice. Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at gdcdepts27@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. If a party submits on the tentative, the partys email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If any party does not submit on the tentative, the party should make arrangements to appear remotely at the hearing on this matter.

Ruling

GILBERTO VERA VS JOHNNY LOBOS, ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |21STCV34334

Case Number: 21STCV34334 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: July 18, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 21STCV34334 MOTIONS: Motion to Quash Service of Summons MOVING PARTY: Specially Appearing Defendant Francisco Salas-Corona OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND On September 17, 2021, Plaintiff Gilberto Vera (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against Defendants Francisco Salas Corona, Alfonso Del Real Montoya, Johnny Lobos, and Does 1 to 10 for injuries related to an alleged motor vehicle accident that occurred on January 31, 2021. On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of service of the summons and complaint on Francisco Salas-Corona. The proof of service shows the summons and complaint was personally served to Michele Roach, the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), under Vehicle Code sections 17450 and 17454. Specially Appearing Defendant Francisco Salas-Corona (Defendant) now moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, arguing service was defective and as such, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition to this motion. LEGAL STANDARD A defendant . . . may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes:¿ (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her. . . .¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10(a).)¿The motion must be filed on or before the last day on which the defendant must plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow. (Id.) [C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]¿(Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1444.)¿[T]he filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper but only if it complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.¿(Id. at 1441-42.) ¿On a motion to quash service of summons, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the prima facie facts entitling the court to assume jurisdiction, including whether service was in compliance with statutory requirements. (Lebel v Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160.) A court may rely upon the verified declarations of the parties and other competent witnesses. (Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.) A court lacks jurisdiction over a party if there has not been proper service of process.¿(Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.) By driving a car in California, any non-resident (U.S. citizen or foreign national) appoints the Director of the DMV as agent for service of process in any action arising out of an auto accident. (Litwin v. Estate of Formela (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 607, 613 (citing Vehicle Code § 17451).) [T]he Vehicle Code provides a method whereby persons from outside California, who become involved in litigation as the result of their use of a motor vehicle on the highways of this state, may be sued here and, although they have left the state, may be effectively served with process so that in personam judgments may be rendered. (Litwin, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at 613.) Vehicle Code section 17454 contains that method: Service of process shall be made by leaving one copy of the summons and complaint in the hands of the director or in his office at Sacramento or by mailing either by certified or registered mail, addressee only, return receipt requested, the copy of the summons and complaint to the office of the director in Sacramento&such service shall be a sufficient service on the nonresident subject to compliance with Section 17455. Vehicle Code section 17455 requires that: A notice of service and a copy of the summons and complaint shall be forthwith sent by registered mail by the plaintiff or his attorney to the defendant. Personal service of the notice and a copy of the summons and complaint upon the defendant wherever found outside this State shall be the equivalent of service by mail. Vehicle Code section 17456 sets forth the manner of proving service: Proof of compliance with Section 17455 shall be made in the event of service by mail by affidavit of the plaintiff or his attorney showing said mailing, together with the return receipt of the United States post office bearing the signature of the defendant. The affidavit and receipt shall be appended to the original summons which shall be filed with the court from out of which the summons issued within such time as the court may allow for the return of the summons. In short, to serve a defendant through the DMV a plaintiff must both serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the DMV and mail another copy directly to the defendant. Under Section 17456, any proof of service must include a receipt signed by the defendant, indicating that the defendant has actually received the package. In compelling proof of service by a return receipt bearing the signature of [the] defendant the statute requires actual delivery to the defendant by registered mail of a copy of the notice, summons, and complaint. (Weisfeld v. Superior Court (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 148, 151.) DISCUSSION Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to show that he was a non-resident of California when the accident occurred. Additionally, he argues that the proof of service fails to show under section 17455, that notice of service was sent to Defendant by registered mail. The Court notes that the proof of service filed on March 8, 2024 fails to show that a copy of the summons and complaint was mailed to Defendant. Plaintiff does not oppose this motion and therefore fails to meet his burden to show that Defendant was a non-resident at the time of the accident and that he complied with Vehicle Code section 17455. As a result, the motion to quash is granted. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Therefore, the Court GRANTS Specially Appearing Defendant Francisco Salas-Coronas motion to quash service of summons and complaint. Defendant to provide notice and file a proof of service of such.

Ruling

RAMIREZ, CATALINA vs SUPERCUTS INC a)

Jul 15, 2024 |CV-22-005931

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Ruling

ROGER FONKEN ET AL VS. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY ET AL

Jul 16, 2024 |CGC24277212

On Asbestos Law and Motion Calendar for Tuesday, July 16, 2024, in Department 301, Line 6. Plaintiff's Motion for Order Granting Preference in Setting Case for Trial, and Extending Discovery cutoff is GRANTED under CCP Section 36(a). No opposition filed. 1. The trial date is November 4, 2024 at 11:15 a.m. in Department 206. a. Last day pursuant to C.C.P. section 36(f) is November 12, 2024. b. The parties shall follow the California Rules of Court, San Francisco Local Rules, and Local Rule 20. 2. The last day for hearing summary judgment/adjudication motions is October 29, 2024. a. Summary judgment/adjudication motions shall be brought on regular notice pursuant to the relevant provisions of the C.C.P., unless the parties stipulate otherwise. b. Before a party files and serves a summary judgment/adjudication motion, it must contact the clerk to make a reservation. c. The Court allows a maximum of four summary judgment/adjudication motions per day to be calendared, unless good cause is found to exceed this number. Contact the clerk to schedule a good cause hearing. 3. Time to respond to written discovery not yet served is shortened to 20 days. a. For written discovery that has already been served, responses are due within 20 days of this hearing or by the date determined by the C.C.P., whichever is earlier. b. Any issue/dispute that requires meet and confer, shall occur in person or via telephone, not by email or letter. 4. Electronic service is considered the equivalent of personal service. 5. The fact discovery cut-off date is October 18, 2024. 6. The expert discovery cut-off date is November 1, 2024. 7. All bankruptcy documents shall be turned over to defendants no later than August 16, 2024. a. If Plaintiff submits documents to bankruptcy trusts after this date, they must notify Defendants no later than five days after submission. b. The fact discovery cut-off does not apply to bankruptcy documents. 8. No later than July 30, 2024: a. Plaintiff must provide a statement to each Defendant stating the name and contact information of each lay person with knowledge of any facts supporting Plaintiff's claims as to each Defendant. b. Defendants must provide a statement stating the name and contact information of each lay person with knowledge of facts supporting Defendant's affirmative defenses. c. Any person not identified on the statements may be barred from testifying at trial or presenting a declaration on a summary judgment motion. (Tentative ruling continues in Part 2 of 2.)

Ruling

Joshua Laine vs Elizabeth Hunter et al.

Jul 16, 2024 |STK-CV-UPI-2024-0004888

TENTATIVE RULING NOTICE Tentative rulings for Law and Motion will be posted electronically by 1:30 p.m. the day before the hearing. Any party wishing to contest or argue the tentative ruling must email the court at civilcourtclerks@sjcourts.org. that they intend to appear remotely no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. The Department and Case Number must be in the header of the email. The email must include the Department, Case number, Case Name, Motion, party’s name and email, date and time of the hearing, issues they plan to argue, and that they have informed the opposing party. The party must also notify affected counsel, or unrepresented parties, that they intend to appear, no later than 4:00 PM on the day before the scheduled hearing. Unless the Court and opposing counsel have been notified, the tentative ruling shall become the ruling of the Court without oral argument. To attend the remote hearing with Judge Kronlund in Dept. 10-D: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # and Pin # as follows: Bridge # 6940 Pin # 3782 Tentative Ruling Plaintiff's motion for Preliminary Injunction is Denied. CCP Section 527. Plaintiff's motion is untimely as he did not provide at least 16 court days' service of the motion as required. CCP Section 1005(b). Nor did Plaintiff file the Reply at least 5 court days prior to the hearing, assuming he had timely filed his motion. Id. The form of the notice of the motion to Defense was improper by way of a sentence at the bottom of an e-mail. CRC 3.1300(b). The Plaintiff appears to seek a Writ of Mandate from this Court, which is improper as this Court is of the same level, trial court level, as the two courts which issued the DVRO and the CPO against Plaintiff. Only a higher court has authority to review a trial court's Orders- not another trial court. To stay or vacate the DVRO and CPO, Plaintiff needs to seek relief at the proper Appellate Court. That would be by filing a timely Writ or Appeal, as the case may be. Even if all of the above fatal problems didn't exist, there are more problems with Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, as it is extremely unlikely he will prevail on the merits of his case. This is because two separate courts, Criminal and Family, have already found the facts and circumstances underlying the restraining orders to have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. This necessarily means, Plaintiff isn't able to prevail as he can't meet his burden of proof. Additionally, Plaintiff can't prove he will suffer greater interim harm compared to the Defendants if the injunction is denied, under these circumstances where Plaintiff was charged with a criminal case against one of the Defendants, and two restraining orders in two different courts were issued against Plaintiff, based on the underlying conduct which is the basis of Plaintiff's complaint. Multiple police reports were generated with at least two different law enforcement agencies, with allegations by Defendants against Plaintiff, of which one or more resulted in criminal charges being filed and two restraining orders in two different courts being granted. This shows that the balance of harm favors Defendants in this case. The Defendants exercised their Constitutional rights and litigation rights by generating police reports and seeking redress through the courts in which they obtained valid restraining orders. Finally, Plaintiff is not being prevented from pursuing his litigation by the denial of this injunction. Barbara A. Kronlund

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KRASHE DOMINO vs. JULIO OLVERA

Jul 17, 2024 |PURDY, MONICA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-10411

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DERRICK BLOOMER vs. RALPH GUTIERREZ, et al

Jan 17, 2023 |PARKER, TONYA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-23-00741

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Jul 18, 2024 |ACEVES, MARIA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-10475

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SHELIA RODELL LUCAS, et al vs. SAIRA MARIBEL VARELA MARTINEZ, et al

Jul 11, 2022 |PARKER, TONYA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-22-07769

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BRIANA LOERA vs. OTIS PITTS

Jul 18, 2024 |TOBOLOWSKY, EMILY |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-24-10513

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MARKEIDRE BROXTON, et al vs. LONE STAR RAILROAD CONTRACTORS, INC., et al

Mar 13, 2023 |PARKER, TONYA |OTHER PERSONAL INJURY |DC-23-03410

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SHELIA RODELL LUCAS, et al vs. SAIRA MARIBEL VARELA MARTINEZ, et al

Jul 11, 2022 |PARKER, TONYA |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-22-07769

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GLORIA MYERS vs. JOHN ANDREW VILLAREAL, et al

Feb 18, 2022 |TILLERY, DALE |MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT |DC-22-01998

9-18-2012 - Motion - Strike CV - DC0902215 - 10480787 - MOTION - STRIKE September 18, 2012 (2024)
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